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Although the corrective tax has long been viewed by economists as a theoretically 
desirable remedy for the problem of harmful externalities, its actual use has been limited, 
mainly to the domain of pollution.  Liability, in contrast, has great importance in 
controlling harmful externalities.  I compare the tax and liability here in theory and 
suggest that the conclusions help to explain the observed predominance of liability over 
taxation, except in the area of pollution.  The following factors are emphasized in the 
analysis: inefficiency of incentives under taxes when, as would be typical, it would be 
impractical for the state to incorporate into taxes all of the variables that significantly 
affect expected harm; efficiency of incentives under strict liability, which requires only 
that actual harms be measured; efficiency of incentives to exercise precautions under the 
negligence rule; administrative cost advantages of liability deriving from its being 
applied only when harm occurs; and dilution of incentives under liability when suit 
would be unlikely or injurers would not be able to pay fully for harms caused. 
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The Corrective Tax versus Liability  
As Solutions to the Problem of Harmful Externalities 
 
1. Introduction 
The corrective tax has long been viewed by most economists as a, or the, 
theoretically preferred remedy for the problem of harmful externalities.  Since the writing 
of Pigou, the imposition of a tax equal to the expected harm that an activity generates has 
been taken to be a desirable instrument for the control of harm because the bearing of 
such a tax should lead parties to moderate harm in a socially efficient manner.
1  
Textbooks, surveys of the externality literature, and the oral tradition of the economics 
profession all reflect this general understanding.
2  
When, however, the actual employment of corrective taxes is considered, one sees 
that it is restricted.  The primary area of application of corrective taxes concerns 
pollution, such as that due to carbon and sulfur dioxides and industrial water emissions, 
but even here their use is limited.
3  Taxes on certain non-polluting activities may also 
have corrective elements; the tax on alcohol, for instance, may serve not only as a means 
                                                 
 
1 Pigou (1932, pp. 172-203).  Pigou first articulated the generality of the problem of externalities 
and the possible need for government intervention, including taxation (pp. 192-96), as a solution.   
  
2 For examples from textbooks of the argument that taxes are desirable as a cure for externalities, 
see Mankiw (2009, pp. 210-14), Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2009, pp. 651-60), and Mas-Colell, Whinston, and 
Green (1995, pp. 354-56); for examples from surveys of the externality literature, see Bovenberg and 
Goulder (2002, pp. 1477-90) and Helfand, Berck, and Maull (2003).  Although the tax is viewed as a good 
solution to externality problems, informational difficulties in its implementation and the possibility that 
regulation could sometimes be superior are given increasing attention in the literature, on which see note 8 
below.   
  
 
3 See Stavins (2003) for a review of the use of corrective taxes to control pollution and other 
environmental externalities.  From this review, it appears that taxes are used little, if at all, to control 
pollution in the United States (Table 1, pp. 364-68, lists no use of effluent fees in this country).  However, 
as Stavins documents, certain fees may be partially motivated by a desire to reduce pollution, for example, 
charges for purchase of non-refillable containers and payments for aircraft landings and takeoffs.  Also, 
market-based policies that share features with corrective taxes, notably subsidies and tradeable permit 
systems, are employed to ameliorate environmental externalities. 
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of raising revenue but as well as a way of staunching the social costs of alcoholism.  
Apart from a number of examples like these, though, it is difficult to adduce instances of 
the use of corrective taxes.
   
Thus, it is evident that the territory of the corrective tax covers only a tiny fraction 
of the total terrain of personal and business activities that can cause harm to others, from 
driving a car, to cooking with a barbecue, to transporting oil, to using a crane in 
construction.  The list of activities for which problems of harm are not addressed by 
corrective taxes is practically endless. 
The typical ways that government does intervene to control harmful activities are 
through policies apart from corrective taxes, and notably through regulation and the 
imposition of liability on injurers for harms that they cause.
4  In this article, I consider 
liability as an alternative to taxation.  My objective is to achieve an understanding of the 
relative merits of liability and of taxation in theory, and to see if this understanding sheds 
light on the observed dominance of liability over taxation as a means of controlling 
harmful activities.
5   
I begin in Section 2 with a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of 
corrective taxation.  The standard advantage of taxation is, as noted, that it can in theory 
lead to socially desirable control of harmful activities: if a party who is engaged in a 
harmful activity has to pay a tax equal to the expected harm that it causes, the party 
should be induced to efficiently reduce the expected harm.     
                                                 
4 The injunction and criminal sanctions are other important instruments of control.  
 
 
5 That the scope of use of liability is great is evident from, for example, references on tort law, 
such as Dobbs (2000), whereas the use of corrective taxes, even under the broadest definition, is miniscule 
by comparison. 
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Implementing taxation would often be problematic, however.  A major difficulty 
is that the expected harm would frequently be difficult for the tax authority to estimate 
because it usually depends on a multiplicity of variables.  The expected harm associated 
with the use of a crane, for example, would be hard to gauge because it would depend on 
the size of the crane, the nature of the crane’s loads, the care exercised by the crane’s 
operators, the number of passersby exposed to risk from crane accidents, and so forth.  
For this reason, I assume for the most part that taxes would be incomplete – that taxes 
would be an explicit function of only a subset of the variables that determine the expected 
harm. 
Taxes would suffer from two problems on account of their incompleteness.
6  
First, they would often be inaccurate (for instance, too high if the number of passersby 
exposed to risk from cranes is less than average, too low if the number of passersby is 
greater than average), leading to inefficiency.  Second, taxes would result in creation of 
excessive risk to the extent that dimensions of care and other untaxed variables are under 
the control of taxed parties (if care in the use of cranes is not taxed, there will be no tax-
related incentives to take such care). 
A third factor reducing the desirability of taxation is the administrative costs of 
their use, especially in contexts where the number of occasions in which the tax would 
have to be imposed is great. 
I suggest that these drawbacks of taxation would be significant for most harmful 
activities, but not for activities that generate certain important types of pollution.  In the 
domain of pollution, the problems of measuring the expected harm appear often to be of a 
                                                 
 
6 The two problems to be described are studied in a model of taxation versus liability in Shavell 
(2011).      5
relatively low order, administrative costs may not be high, and the ability to utilize 
taxation may thus be reasonably good  
In Section 3, I consider strict liability, one of the two major forms of liability, and  
I compare strict liability to corrective taxation.  Under strict liability, an injurer is 
supposed to pay for the harm caused to a victim.  The classic argument in favor of strict 
liability is that it should lead to socially desirable control of harmful activities: if a party 
who undertakes a harmful activity is required to pay for the actual harm that occurs, the 
party should be properly induced to lower the expected harm.  However, for strict 
liability to influence injuring parties optimally, they must always be sued and have to pay 
for the harm they do.  If parties who cause harm might not be sued – because harm 
cannot be attributed to them or because it is too dispersed to make suit financially 
worthwhile – or if they lack the assets to pay fully for the harm, the incentive inherent in 
the threat of liability will be diluted. 
Strict liability possesses several advantages over taxation, and taxation holds an 
advantage over strict liability.  To impose strict liability and create desirable incentives, 
the state need only measure the harms that occur (losses caused by actual crane 
accidents), implying that the problems due to incompleteness of taxes are avoided; there 
is no inefficiency due to inaccuracy of taxes and no problem of excessive risk due to lack 
of tax-associated incentives to take care.  Another advantage of strict liability concerns 
administrative costs.  Unlike taxation, strict liability applies only when harm occurs, 
meaning that liability may result in administrative costs savings to the extent that the 
probability of harm is low, as it often is.  On the other hand, taxation enjoys an advantage 
over liability because the factors that reduce the effectiveness of liability (the possibility   6
that suit would not be brought and inability to pay for the harm that occurs) do not 
usually lower the effectiveness of the tax.  
This comparison of strict liability to taxation appears to favor liability for most 
harmful activities.  However, it seems that the comparison favors taxation in the area of 
general pollution, especially because the likelihood that suits would be brought for 
pollution-caused harm or that full damages would be paid for it is not high, 
compromising the effectiveness of liability.    
In Section 4, I examine liability based on the negligence rule, the other major 
form of liability.  Under the negligence rule, an injurer is obligated to pay for the harm 
caused to a victim only if the injurer’s behavior fell below a legal standard of appropriate 
care.  The virtue of the negligence rule is that it can induce injurers to exercise efficient 
care (safely secure loads to cranes).  But it does not lead injurers to moderate their levels 
of harmful activity (the number of times cranes are used), for the level of activity is 
ordinarily not part of the negligence determination.  In any event, for the negligence rule 
to affect injurers’ behavior, they must expect to be sued for negligence and to pay for 
harm; otherwise their incentives to take appropriate care will be reduced.      
It follows that the negligence rule is superior to the tax in controlling dimensions 
of care, is inferior to the tax in controlling the level of harmful activities, enjoys a 
possible administrative cost advantage over the tax owing to the ex post nature of 
liability, and suffers from the disadvantage that its effectiveness is lowered by the general 
factors that dilute expected liability.   
In Section 5, I address the issue of the optimal rule of liability – the choice 
between strict liability and negligence.  The relevance of the choice for the comparison of   7
taxation to liability is that the comparison of taxation should be made to the optimal rule 
of liability, not just to strict liability or just to the negligence rule.  This consideration 
reinforces my conjecture that liability is superior to the tax for controlling most harmful 
activities.  
In Section 6, I consider the use of taxation in combination with liability.  That is, I 
ask how these policies might complement each other, and also how they might work at 
cross purposes, principally because imposition of both taxation and liability could result 
in payments by injurers that exceed the expected harm that they generate.  
Before proceeding, let me note that my topic lies within the intellectual agenda set 
out by Ronald Coase fifty years ago in his important article, “The Problem of Social 
Costs,”
7 and thus seems fitting for inclusion in this issue of the Journal of Law and 
Econmics published in celebration of his long scholarly career.  Coase criticized Pigou in 
his article, mainly because Coase questioned the presumption that government 
intervention is usually needed to correct externality problems; he emphasized that the 
concerned parties might well be able to bargain toward a resolution of their problems.  
The issues raised here about Pigouvian taxation are different from those examined by 
Coase, of course, as they concern not whether government intervention is needed to 
correct externalities but rather its optimal character if it is.  What is said below relates 
also to economics literature on informational difficulties that arise in applying corrective 
taxation,
8 although the economics literature essentially ignores liability as an alternative 
                                                 
7 Coase (1960).  
 
 
8 See, for example, Adar and Griffin (1976), Baumol and Oates (1988), Bovenberg and Goulder 
(2002, pp. 1524-30), Kaplow and Shavell (2002), and especially Weitzman (1974).  This literature focuses 
on variation among parties in the costs of controlling pollution and uncertainty in the harm it causes, and 
compares taxation to regulation.  Here I focus on variation among parties in the expected harm caused by   8
to taxation.
9  What is said relates as well to law and economics literature comparing 
different policies for the control of harmful externalities.
10     
 
2.  The Corrective Tax 
In order to evaluate the virtues and demerits of the corrective tax, one must, of 
course, define it.  I said above that it equals the expected harm – the probability-
discounted harm – not the actual harm.  The definition of the tax as the expected harm is 
consistent with most economic literature concerned with taxes and uncertain harm
11 and 
is in keeping with the notion of the tax as an amount collected at the time that parties 
engage in potentially harmful activities.  Were the tax conceived to be an amount 
collected ex post, equal to the actual harm rather than the expected harm, then, for 
example, in the context of pollution, calculation of the tax would require the state to 
identify how much disease was in fact caused by a pollutant, how many animals died due 
                                                                                                                                                 
their activities and the difficulties associated with untaxed variables that affect the expected harm, and I 
compare taxation to liability.   
 
 
9 For example, Mankiw (2009, pp. 210-19) and Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, pp. 354-
59) make no mention of liability, and Bovenberg and Goulder (2002, pp. 1527-28) and Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld (2009, pp. 671-72) note liability only briefly; all of these references treat regulation as a major 
alternative to taxation.  I am aware of no article in the economics literature that examines liability as a 
substitute for taxation.  The lack of attention given to liability in the economics literature is unfortunate 
given its relevance to the control of harmful externalities.  Even in the domain of pollution, to which the 
economics literature on externalities devotes its main attention, liability plays an important role; see, for 
instance, Farber, Freeman, Carlson, and Findley (2006, pp. 154-68, 841-925).      
 
10 See Shavell (1993), noting the possible administrative advantages of liability over the tax in that 
liability applies only if harm occurs, and the weaknesses of liability in that liability requires that suit be 
brought and that parties have assets sufficient to pay for harm; and White and Wittman (1983), 
emphasizing the advantages of strict liability over the tax due to informational problems in applying the 
latter.  See also the remarks of Posner (2007, pp. 396-400) about pollution, stressing informational 
difficulties of implementing pollution taxes and the weaknesses of liability.   
 
 
11 See, for example, the sources in note 8.  In no case, to my knowledge, is the tax assumed to be 
the actual harm in a model with uncertain harm.  Instead the tax is taken to be the expected harm or else 
(and more commonly) a linear function of a single taxed variable, notably the level of a pollutant, which 
equals the expected harm at a particular level of emissions.   
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to exposure to it, how much paint prematurely peeled on account of it, and so forth.
12  
Instead, I presume the corrective tax to be an amount collected ex ante and based on a 
statistical estimate of the harm that would come about due to the emission of a pollutant 
or whatever is the harmful activity at issue.  
The standard argument regarding the efficiency of the corrective tax is, as was 
noted, that when an injurer makes any decision, the injurer will take into account its 
influence on the tax and thus on expected harm; consequently, the injurer’s decisions will 
be socially appropriate.
13  A polluter will therefore increase its level of production and its 
accompanying discharges of pollutants if and only if the extra profits that result exceed 
the expected harm from the pollutants; or if a polluter contemplates purchasing a device 
to abate the discharges, it will do so if and only if the cost of the device is less than the 
expected harm avoided. 
There are, however, a number of problems that would arise in employing 
corrective taxes.  To appreciate the character of these problems, it will be useful for me 
first to list several examples of activities and to identify for each variables that are 
important determinants of the expected harm.     
Polluting activities.  The expected harm from some forms of pollution is a 
function mainly of the quantity of the pollutant released by the polluter.  In the stock 
example of pollution, this characteristic of pollutants is assumed, and it might be thought 
to apply in fact in contexts where pollutants spread over large areas and their ambient 
                                                 
 
12 Likewise, were the corrective tax on alcohol defined to be the actual harm due to its 
consumption, the various problems flowing from that consumption – such as accidents caused by drunk 
driving, domestic violence, and difficulties at the workplace – would all have to be traced and properly 
evaluated.  
 
 
13 I will often call the party engaged in a potentially harmful activity the injurer even though this 
party may not turn out actually to cause harm. 
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level is the chief determinant of expected harm.  Pollution that fits this description is 
typically the aggregated result of discharges from many sources, and I will refer to such 
pollution as general pollution.
14   
However, pollution may be of a type such that the expected harm depends 
importantly not just on the quantity of the pollutant that is discharged by a polluter, but 
also on additional variables particular to the polluter.  Suppose that the pollutant is a 
chemical that will cause harm primarily in a circumscribed area surrounding the polluter 
if the chemical infiltrates a person’s water supply.  Then the expected harm would 
depend not just on the amount of the chemical that is discharged by the polluter, but also 
on the number of individuals living within the zone of danger determined by the 
polluter’s location and whether these individuals draw their water from wells (that could 
be contaminated by the chemical) or obtain it through pipes (that could not).  I will 
sometimes refer to pollution of this type as localized pollution. 
Operation of cranes.  As I indicated above, the expected harm caused by the use 
of a crane is influenced by factors including the type of the crane (height, weight, tensile 
strength of lifting cables), the nature of the objects it lifts, the intensity of its use, the care 
with which it is operated, and the exposure of victims to risk (the number of people 
vulnerable to injury were the crane to topple or to drop an object). 
Driving cars.  Here the expected harm from accidents depends on miles driven, 
care exercised in driving (speed, use of turn signals), vehicle condition and maintenance 
(affecting the operation of lights, brakes, horn), type and weight of vehicle, 
                                                 
 
14 Examples are pollution that leads to depletion of the ozone layer in the atmosphere or pollution 
that contributes to global warming.   
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characteristics of roads on which driving is done (number of lanes, visibility, traffic 
density), and so forth.
15  
Clearing ice and snow from sidewalks.  The expected harm from ice and snow left 
on a sidewalk is affected by, among other things, its quantity, the time it takes to melt, its 
slipperiness, steps taken to reduce its slipperiness (use of salt, sawdust, wood planks), and 
the foot traffic on the sidewalk.   
These examples illustrate the point that the variables which are relevant to the 
determination of the expected harm from an activity are usually numerous; the case of 
general pollution, for which the expected harm is a function mainly of a single variable, 
the quantity of emissions, is not typical.  Hence, it would frequently be difficult or 
impractical for the state to employ a tax that depends on all of the variables that bear in a 
real way on the expected harm.   
Therefore, I now assume that a tax would be incomplete: it would be an explicit 
function of only a subset of the variables that determine the expected harm.  However, I 
assume that the taxed variables would include a variable called the level of activity, such 
as the number of construction sites at which a crane is used, the number of miles driven 
in a car, or the amount of snow left on a sidewalk.  Both taxed and untaxed variables 
might be chosen by parties or be otherwise determined.
16   
The presence of untaxed variables that influence the expected harm would lead to 
two types of problem.  First, taxes would often be inaccurate, unequal to the expected 
                                                 
 
15 In discussing the example of driving, I will be considering harm due to accidents, not harm due 
to pollution from the use of gasoline.   
 
 
16 To amplify, let x be the vector of taxed variables, y the vector of untaxed variables, and h(x, y)  
the expected harm given x and y.  The tax t(x) is assumed to equal the expected harm given x.  I will use 
this notation in later footnotes.  
   12
harm.  The tax on crane operations would often be inaccurate if it were not based on the 
loads that a crane lifts and the exposure of victims to risk; the tax on driving would often 
be biased if it did not reflect the care and skill of drivers and the types of roads on which 
driving is done; the tax on snow and ice left on sidewalks would often be erroneous if it 
did not depend on the slipperiness of the snow, how long it takes to melt, and the amount 
of foot traffic on the sidewalks.  Hence, the tax would sometimes be too high, such as 
when a crane lifts lighter than average loads and few individuals are exposed to risk at a 
construction site, when ice and snow quickly melts and there is little foot traffic on the 
sidewalks, or when drivers are careful and drive new cars mainly on well-designed, 
limited access roads.  And sometimes the tax would be too low, such as when an older 
crane lifts heavy loads and many individuals are exposed to risk, or when ice and snow 
will remain for a long period where foot traffic is high, and so forth.     
The general consequence of inaccurate taxes is that parties would choose taxed 
variables inappropriately.  Parties for whom the tax exceeds the expected harm would 
engage too little in their activities and parties for whom the tax is less than the expected 
harm would engage excessively in their activities.  Drivers and crane operators for whom 
the tax is too high would drive too little and use cranes too little; and conversely for 
drivers and crane operators for whom the tax is too low.
17  Not just the level of activity 
                                                 
 
17 To illustrate, suppose that x is the level of activity, y is an exogenous parameter (such as an 
index of the number of potential victims of harm) that varies across the population of injurers, and h(x, y) = 
xy, so that y is the expected harm per unit of activity.  Suppose also that the utility or benefit of an injurer is 
b(x), which is increasing and concave in x.  Then, under a utilitarian social welfare function, the socially 
best x maximizes b(x) – xy; this best x (which I assume to be positive) is determined by b′(x) = y and will be 
denoted by x*(y), which can be verified to be increasing in y.   The tax t(x) is assumed to equal xE(y), 
where E(y) is the expected value of y.  Hence, all injurers will choose x determined by b′(x) = E(y), so all 
will choose x*(E(y)).  Hence, those injurers for whom y < E(y) choose too high an x – because for them, 
x*(E(y)) > x*(y); and those injurers for whom y > E(y) choose too low an x – because for them, x*(E(y)) < 
x*(y).  For elaboration, see Shavell (2011). 
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but also other taxed variables would be distorted by inaccurate taxes.  For example, if the 
tax on driving depends on vehicle maintenance, then too much would be invested in 
vehicle maintenance if the tax is too high, and too little if the tax is too low.   
The second problem associated with the presence of untaxed variables is that 
parties would choose these untaxed variables without regard to their effect on expected 
harm, implying that expected harm would tend to be socially excessive.  Suppose that 
taxes on crane operators and on drivers do not depend on their degree of care, or that 
taxes on snow and ice do not depend on whether salting or other steps are taken to reduce 
its slipperiness.  Then the care exercised in the use of cranes and of cars would be too low 
and too little would be done to reduce the slipperiness of snow and ice because 
individuals would receive no reduction in their taxes for lowering expected harm in these 
ways.  In other words, there would be an overall tendency for expected harm to be 
inefficiently high to the extent that untaxed variables are under the control of injurers.  It 
should be noted that this point is different from that discussed in the previous paragraph 
concerning inaccuracy of taxes and the choice made about taxed variables; the problem 
here has no necessary connection to inaccuracy of taxes.
18   
                                                 
 
18 Suppose as in the preceding note that h(x, y) = xy, but assume here for simplicity that y is the 
same for all individuals.  Assume also that y is given by y(e), where e is an individual’s level of care and y 
is decreasing and convex in e.  Assume further that the individual exercises e each time he engages in his 
activity and thus that his utility is b(x) – xe.  Then the socially best x and e maximize b(x) – xe – xy(e)) = 
b(x) – x(e + y(e)).  Hence, the optimal y and e (which I assume to be positive) are determined by b′(x) = e + 
y(e), and y′(e) = –1; these optimal values will be denoted by x* and e*.  Note that e* minimizes e + y(e).  
The individual will choose x and e to maximize b(x) – t(x) – xe, so that he will choose e = 0 < e*.  That is, 
he has no reason to exercise costly care to lower y since the tax depends only on his level of activity x.  
Because the tax t(x) equals xE(y), it reduces to xy(0).  Therefore, the individual will choose x to maximize 
b(x) – xy(0), and x will be determined by b′(x) = y(0).  This can be shown to imply that x < x* (because y(0) 
> e* + y(e*)).  In other words, the untaxed variable y will be chosen so that expected harm per unit of 
activity is excessive and the level of activity is suboptimal, although it is optimal given the suboptimal y.  
Also, observe that the tax is not inaccurate – it equals the actual expected harm that all (identical) 
individuals generate; the inefficiency is due to the fact that there is no incentive to improve the level of the 
untaxed variable y through the exercise of care e.  Again, for elaboration, see Shavell (2011). 
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Another problem associated with taxation concerns the administrative costs of its 
use.  To apply corrective taxes, three tasks must be undertaken, each of which involves 
expense.  First, the state must ascertain the functional relationship between taxed 
variables and expected harm.  Because this functional relationship would be likely to 
depend on multiple variables, its determination would not be simple.  Second, the state 
must observe the taxed variables.  In many contexts, the costs of observation would be 
significant or even prohibitive.  If the amount of snow and ice left on sidewalks were 
taxed, measurements would have to be made at virtually all property after each snowfall.  
If steps taken to reduce the slipperiness of snow and ice were a taxed variable, or if the 
care exercised in driving a car or in operating a crane were a taxed variable, then the 
amount of monitoring required of tax authorities would be truly great.  Third, the state 
must collect the tax, which would often involve non-negligible expense.  
In describing these administrative costs, I have largely taken the identity of the 
taxed variables as given, but the selection of the set of taxed variables is obviously an 
economic decision.  A variable will be desirable to tax if the benefit of so doing, derived 
from improved incentives to reduce harm, exceeds the administrative costs of adding the 
variable to the other taxed variables.  In considering taxes, then, we should be thinking of 
taxes that incorporate the optimal set of taxed variables.  
Now that I have described the various problems associated with the corrective tax 
– inefficiency due to inaccuracy, excessive risk, and administrative costs – let me 
summarize by commenting on their likely significance for activities producing general 
pollution versus for most other activities.     15
It seems that taxes can perform tolerably well in moderating harm from general 
pollution.  In this setting, the expected harm depends mainly on a single variable, the 
quantity of emissions, so that a tax could provide a good estimate of expected harm and 
lead to approximately desirable behavior of taxed parties; problems of inefficiency and of 
excessive risk due to the presence of untaxed variables would be largely moot.  As long 
as the measurement and the collection of taxes would not be difficult, therefore, the tax 
could function reasonably well to control general pollution.
19 
  However, for most harmful activities my conjecture is that taxes would not be 
advantageous to employ.  A primary reason is that, as I have argued, there would usually 
be many variables that exert real influence on the expected harm but that would be left 
untaxed.  These would typically include dimensions of care and factors describing 
potential victims’ exposure to risk.  The omission of such variables from the tax would 
result in inaccuracy and serious inefficiencies – some parties would do too little to reduce 
harm and others too much.  Further, the omission of variables relevant to the expected 
harm would lead to excessive risk because parties would have no tax-related reason to 
choose these variables to reduce expected harm; and this I have suggested would be an 
especial problem with variables relating to care.  The other important reason for my 
conjecture that taxes would not perform well concerns administrative costs.  On one 
hand, the administrative costs that would actually be incurred in measuring taxed 
variables and collecting taxes would often be high owing to the sheer number of instances 
in which parties engage in potentially harmful activities.  On the other, administrative 
costs are the latent cause of the problems stemming from the existence of untaxed 
                                                 
 
19 Localized pollution might not be well-controlled by a tax.  What I am about to say in the next 
paragraph about non-polluting activities also describes localized pollution in many respects.     16
variables, for it is the need to avoid high administrative costs that explains why there 
would be untaxed variables were corrective taxes employed for most harmful activities.  
 
3.  Strict Liability versus the Corrective Tax  
By strict liability, I refer as noted to the legal rule that allows victims of accidents 
to collect from injurers an amount equal to the harm that they suffered.
20  Strict liability 
is thus different from the corrective tax in that under strict liability, the injuring party 
pays for the harm that turns out to occur, not for the expected harm before harm 
eventuates.  Under strict liability a polluter would pay for the disease and property 
damage that pollution actually causes rather than a tax based on an estimate of such 
harm; and a crane operator would pay victims for the harms that crane accidents actually 
cause rather than a tax based on the expected harm that crane accidents would bring 
about; and so forth.   
The argument regarding the efficiency of strict liability is similar to that regarding 
the efficiency of the corrective tax.  Namely, if a potential injurer faces a choice about 
any dimension of his behavior, he will make this choice taking into account its influence 
on expected harm, because he will have to pay for the actual harm. 
Let me now compare strict liability to the corrective tax and ask whether, or to 
what extent, strict liability suffers from the problems that I mentioned in regard to the tax. 
The first problem afflicting the tax concerned its inaccuracy.  As I emphasized, for the 
                                                 
 
20 In fact, strict liability may be accompanied by the defense of contributory negligence, according 
to which the injurer would not have to pay a victim who negligently exposed himself to danger.  See, for 
example, Dobbs (2000, pp. 962-63).  This feature of strict liability can induce victims to take desirable 
precautions; see Brown (1972).  For simplicity, however, I abstract from the issue of victim behavior in this 
article. 
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tax to equal the expected harm, the state would need to measure all the variables that 
influence the expected harm, but the state would be unlikely to be able to do this. 
In contrast, accuracy of incentives should be good under strict liability.  Under 
strict liability, an injurer will automatically face expected sanctions equal to expected 
harm as long as the injurer is held liable whenever he causes harm and the state 
accurately measures the extent of harm.  A crane operator will face expected sanctions 
equal to the expected harm arising from crane accidents as long as victims of crane 
accidents sue and collect damages for the harms they sustain; unlike under the tax, there 
will be no need for the state to keep track of the usage of cranes, their type, the exposure 
of potential victims to risk.  Likewise, a person who leaves snow and ice on the sidewalk 
will face expected sanctions equal to the expected harm as long as those who slip and fall 
bring suit and collect for harm done; there will be no need for the state to measure the 
amount of snow and ice left on the sidewalk, how long it takes to melt, whether it was 
salted, and so forth. 
The second problem for the tax was that variables excluded from the tax, and 
notably dimensions of care, would not be controlled by it, resulting in excessive risk.  
This is not a problem under strict liability because it induces actors to choose all their 
actions so as to optimally reduce expected harm.  Under strict liability, a crane operator 
will be induced to maneuver his crane with proper caution and not to lift unduly heavy 
loads even though he would not do so under a tax if care in crane use and the weight of 
loads were untaxed variables; and a person will be led to salt ice if that is desirable, even 
though he would not do that under a tax if such actions did not affect the tax 
determination.     18
The third factor creating a problem for the tax concerned administrative cost.  In 
this regard too, strict liability appears to enjoy a basic advantage relative to the tax.  One 
reason is that the state need not ascertain the functional relationship between observed 
variables and expected harm; it need only measure the harm that eventuates.   
Another reason is that liability applies only if harm arises, so that administrative 
costs (litigants’ legal costs and the costs of operating the judicial system) are incurred 
only with a probability, whereas the tax applies whenever a party engages in an activity, 
so that administrative costs are borne with certainty.  When the likelihood of harm is 
small, which is the case in many contexts, like operating a crane or driving, that the 
bearing of administrative costs occurs only when harm eventuates can be a significant 
advantage of liability over the tax.   
The comparison of administrative costs also depends, of course, on the relative 
magnitudes of these costs conditional on the application of strict liability and of the tax.  
Under liability the fact of harm and its extent need to be established, and under the tax the 
levels of taxed variables need to be ascertained.  Either of these tasks could be the more 
expensive.  If the liability task is the more expensive,
21 the probability-related advantage 
of liability would be reduced or could be reversed, whereas if the tax task is the more 
expensive, the probability-related advantage of liability would be reinforced.  
Now let me turn to three factors that present problems for liability, because they 
all lower expected liability payments to below the expected harm.   One such factor is 
difficulty in attributing harm to the party who caused it, for example, harm from pollution 
to the generator of pollution.  If the connection between the harm and the party who 
                                                 
 
21 In considering the administrative costs of applying strict liability (and, below, the negligence 
rule), it should be kept in mind that the great majority of cases settle, substantially reducing administrative 
costs.    19
caused it cannot be established, a successful suit cannot be brought, reducing the 
expected liability of the party.  Another factor is that the magnitude of the harm may be 
below the cost of suit.  If this is so, there will be no financial incentive to bring suit, 
decreasing the expected liability of parties who might cause harms of low magnitude.  An 
additional factor is the judgment proof problem, namely, that the party who caused harm 
might not have assets sufficient to pay fully for it.  This could reduce the victim’s 
incentive to bring suit, and in any event would mean that the amount paid would be less 
than the harm.  Hence, the judgment proof problem can diminish the expected liability of 
injuring parties both by reducing the likelihood of suit and the magnitude of payments if 
suit is brought.   
The foregoing factors that dilute expected liability would not affect the 
functioning of the tax, with one possible and partial exception.  It is clear that inability to 
identify who was the cause of harm would not affect the functioning of the tax, as the tax 
is premised on an estimate of expected harm.  It is also evident that the possibility that 
harm might be too low in magnitude to stimulate suit is not of relevance to the 
functioning of the tax.  However, the judgment proof problem could mean that an injurer 
would not be able to pay the tax in full.  Yet this is less likely to be the case for the tax 
than for the liability payment, for the tax is based on expected harm, and thus would often 
be lower than the actual harm.  Hence, the judgment proof problem is less relevant for the 
tax than for liability.
22 
                                                 
 
22 To be clear, let me show that the tax that a person pays will exceed his expected liability, 
assuming that the harm h that he might cause could exceed his assets a.  Let h be continuously distributed 
between 0 and some maximum m, where 0 < a < m.  The tax t that the person pays is min(a, E(h)).  The 
liability payment that the person makes is min(a, h), so his expected liability is E(l) = E(min(a, h)) < E(h).  
If E(h) ≤ a, then t =  E(h) > E(l).  On the other hand, if E(h) > a, then t = a > E(min(a, h)) = E(l).  (Note 
that a > E(min(a, h)) holds since min(a, h) < a for h < a.)  Therefore, E(l) < t. 
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In the light of the first three factors suggesting that strict liability has an advantage 
over taxation and the factors just discussed suggesting the opposite, I can add to the 
conjectures made at the end of the previous section about the desirability of taxes for the 
control of general pollution and their undesirability for the control of most other harmful 
activities.   
I said before that taxes would be expected to work reasonably well for general 
pollution.  It now also appears that liability would not be likely to function desirably in 
this context, especially because of the difficulty in attributing harm to its source.  Because 
general pollution is the result of discharges from many different sources, it would 
typically be impractical or impossible to attribute particular harms to particular polluters.  
Moreover, difficulties in establishing causation would sometimes be compounded by the 
possibility that factors apart from pollution interact with it in the generation of harm.  
Additionally, the problem that the magnitude of harm may be too low to make suit 
worthwhile could sometimes be relevant.  Consider, for example, premature peeling of 
paint or minor eye irritation.  Furthermore, the judgment proof problem could apply 
because pollution can harm a great number of individuals or a large area of land.  The 
joint effect of these factors would often substantially dilute expected liability for polluters 
and thus reinforce the attractiveness of taxes for the control of general pollution.   
I also argued in the previous section that taxes would not be likely to perform well 
for most harmful activities, exemplified by crane accidents, automobile accidents, and 
slips and falls on ice and snow, because the expected harm ordinarily depends on a 
multiplicity of variables that would not be incorporated into the tax.  Hence, the tax 
would be inaccurate and would also lead to excessive risk.  In this section I explained   21
why, under strict liability, expected liability and incentives would tend to be accurate and 
to induce desirable behavior, as long as suit is brought and damages are paid for the harm 
that actually occurs.  It is also true that liability may be administratively cheaper to 
employ than the tax for most activities causing accidental harms, because these activities 
tend to cause harm only with a small probability.  Hence, the tax seems significantly 
inferior to strict liability as an instrument for control of most harmful activities.    
 
4.  Liability Based on the Negligence Rule versus the Corrective Tax   
  Under the negligence rule a party who causes harm is obligated to pay for it only 
if his level of care was found to be subpar, such as failing to monitor a tank holding a 
pollutant for leaks, inadequately securing an object to a crane, or driving a car at 
excessive speed.
23   
The well-known economic argument supporting the negligence rule is that the 
rule can induce parties to exercise optimal levels of care.  Suppose that the duty of care 
that the court requires to escape a finding of negligence is the optimal level of care.  Then 
it will be in the interest of a party to be non-negligent and to take the optimal level of 
care.  For example, suppose that attaching a heavy object to a crane with two sets of 
chains is optimal, because it is relatively inexpensive to do so and that this would 
eliminate a real possibility of a harmful accident.  Then a rational crane operator would 
be motivated by the threat of liability under the negligence rule to use two sets of 
chains.
24 
                                                 
 
23 On the definition and use of the negligence rule, see, for example, Dobbs (2000, pp. 257-73).   
 
24 See originally Brown (1972).  
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This optimality property of the negligence rule is recognized to be limited, 
however, because the rule does not induce parties to choose their levels of activity 
efficiently.  Under the negligence rule, the court does not make a judgment about a 
party’s level of activity, only about the party’s level of care.  In a crane accident in which 
an object falls from a crane and injures an individual, a negligence inquiry would not 
involve a consideration of how many times the crane was used; the inquiry would 
concern only whether the object was properly secured, whether adequate warning of 
hazards was given to passersby, and the like.  Because the level of activity is not 
addressed by the negligence rule, the level of activity will tend to be socially excessive; 
cranes will be used too intensively.  Although parties will exercise optimal care, they will 
not have to pay for the harm that their activities still cause and will engage in them at too 
high a level.
25     
  Now let me compare the negligence rule to the corrective tax.  One consideration 
is the level of care.  The negligence rule desirably controls levels of care, but the tax 
would not include these variables and would fail to control them, resulting in excessive 
risk.  A second consideration is the level of activity.  The tax efficiently controls levels of 
activity, whereas levels of activity tend to be excessive under the negligence rule, as I just 
explained.    
A third issue is administrative costs.  Here the negligence rule enjoys the basic 
advantage that I discussed in regard to strict liability, namely, that the expenses 
associated with the application of liability are not incurred unless harm actually 
                                                 
25 This problem with the negligence rule was initially developed in Shavell (1980).  
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eventuates.
26  Moreover, this advantage could be greater than under strict liability, for 
under the negligence rule, a victim will not pursue a case unless he has reason to believe 
the injurer was negligent.  On the other hand, if there is litigation, it will tend to be more 
expensive than under strict liability, because the issue of fault will need to be resolved. 
   A final consideration is the set of factors that reduce expected liability payments 
to below the expected harm – inability to trace harm to its source, losses that are less than 
the cost of suit, and the judgment proof problem.  As was true with regard to strict 
liability, these factors constitute a disadvantage of the negligence rule relative to the 
tax.
27     
 
5.  The Optimal Liability Rule – Strict Liability or the Negligence Rule – versus the 
Corrective Tax 
  In the last two sections I have compared the two major forms of liability singly to 
the corrective tax, but it is natural also to compare the better of the two liability rules to 
the corrective tax.  It is clear on general grounds that the comparison of the superior 
liability rule to the corrective tax favors liability more than was true in the comparisons 
made in the previous sections.  But there is a more particular reason to consider the 
superior liability rule.   
  Specifically, strict liability is likely to dominate the negligence rule when the 
problem of controlling injurers’ levels of activity adequately is significant.  As explained, 
                                                 
 
26 The administrative cost advantage of the negligence rule explains why it may be socially 
worthwhile to employ that rule but not socially worthwhile to incorporate levels of care into the tax. 
  
27 However, these problems dilute incentives less under the negligence rule than under strict 
liability.  See Shavell (1987, pp. 167-68).  
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an injurer has no incentive to moderate his level of activity under the negligence rule but 
does under strict liability.  This advantage of strict liability will tend to be substantial for 
activities that generate a large expected harm despite the exercise of optimal care, and 
there is some evidence that strict liability is in fact often employed when that is so.
28 
The implication of the foregoing point is to reinforce the view that liability is 
superior to taxation for most harmful activities.  I said in the previous section that a 
drawback of the negligence rule in comparison to the corrective tax is that the negligence 
rule does not control the level of activity, whereas the corrective tax does.  However, this 
problem of liability relative to the tax is implicitly addressed if the form of liability 
changes to strict liability when the social need to address injurers’ levels of activity is 
significant.   
 
6.  Joint Use of Corrective Taxes and Liability 
Although I have been considering corrective taxes and liability as alternative 
means of controlling harmful activities, they could in principle be employed jointly.  In 
this regard, two points should be noted. 
First, there is a general advantage to joint use of corrective taxes and liability, 
because each of these policies can sometimes compensate for problems of the other.  For 
example, liability is unlikely to adequately address the harms that dogs cause because 
many of these harms – consider barking, soiling the environment, and chewing up 
gardens – would usually be too modest to make suit worthwhile and might also be 
difficult to attribute to the particular dogs that caused them.  Hence, a tax on dog 
                                                 
 
28 See Shavell (1980); and see also Landes and Posner (1987, p. 70) and Shavell (1987, pp. 30-32).  
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ownership might ameliorate inadequate incentives under liability to reduce many dog-
related harms.  At the same time, a tax on dog ownership would not induce dog owners to 
take care to prevent dog bites – by leashing dogs, keeping them away from small 
children, and the like – because as I articulated above, a tax would not depend on care.  
The use of liability, however, could well lead dog owners to take precautions to lower the 
risk of dog bites.  Hence, we can see that joint use of taxes and liability could be 
desirable.
29 
Second, however, there is a danger of double-billing for harm that arises if both 
corrective taxes and liability are imposed.  If parties have to pay for more than the harms 
for which they are responsible, they could be induced to take wasteful precautions or be 
discouraged from engaging in socially desirable activities.  If a firm were subject to a 
pollution tax for expected harm and were also strictly liable for actual harm, it would in 
effect be paying for twice the harm it caused.   
This problem of excessive payments under a regime with both taxes and liability 
would be less serious under the negligence rule than under strict liability.  Indeed, if the 
negligence rule functioned flawlessly, parties would always choose to act in a non-
negligent way and would never be found liable. Therefore, the problem of excessive 
payments would not arise.  But uncertainties and imperfections in the negligence 
determination lead to findings of negligence, so that parties who cause harm bear positive 
expected liability under the negligence rule.  Hence, the problem of excessive payments 
would exist under that rule even though it would not be as significant as under strict 
liability.  
                                                 
 
29  In Shavell (2011) I show that under fairly general assumptions joint use of taxes and strict 
liability is desirable, and that, as I am about to explain in the text, the tax should be less than the expected 
harm.    26
The problem of excessive payments under a tax and liability regime seemingly 
could be alleviated by reducing the amount of the tax to below the expected harm and by 
letting expected liability take up the slack in payments, but attention would have to be 
paid to how such a policy is implemented. 
  
7.  Conclusion 
I have compared the corrective tax to liability as solutions to the problem of 
controlling socially harmful activities and have attempted to articulate the advantages of 
each policy in theory.  In light of this inquiry, I concluded that liability should on the 
whole be superior to the corrective tax in governing most harmful activities, a view that is 
in accord with the observed predominance of liability over taxation.
30  My judgments 
about the relative virtues of liability over taxation were based mainly on the 
impracticality of employing taxes that properly reflect the usually numerous variables 
that significantly affect expected harm, on the fact that the state need only measure the 
harm under strict liability to create desirable incentives, on the fact that the negligence 
rule generates desirable incentives to control dimensions of care whereas the tax does not, 
and on administrative cost advantages of liability deriving from its being applied only 
when harm occurs.   
I also suggested that the tax should be superior to liability as a means of 
controlling general pollution.  This view was premised on the assumption that the tax 
                                                 
 
30 Another explanation for the limited use of taxes is political: that they are unpopular because 
they oblige governed parties to make payments.  See, for example, Revesz and Stavins (2007, pp. 558-61), 
who discuss this explanation for the lack of use of taxation in the control of pollution and the appeal of 
regulation as an alternative.  Negligence-based liability would seem to hold political attractions similar to 
those of regulation, for under the negligence rule as under regulation, parties engaged in harmful activities 
do not have to make payments if they adhere to the requirements set out by the state.  Strict liability, 
however, should be politically unpopular for the reason that taxes are said to be.    27
would perform well because only a single variable, the quantity of emissions, largely 
determines expected harm, and on the assumption that incentives under liability would be 
significantly diluted by the inability of victims to attribute harm to injurers and to related 
problems in bringing suit. 
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